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The Pursuit of Pleasure: Gender, Space and Architecture in Regency London by Jane
Rendell. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002. Pp. xiiⳭ248.
$60.00 cloth, $25.00 paper.
The British Regency inhabits both historical, linear time and a specific cultural space. London was the locus of this era, and upper-class men were its
primary players. Despite such dynamic contemporary trends as increasingly
rapid industrialization, the continuing rise of the middle class, the (temporarily) increased freedom of women, and the increasing acceptance of Catholics
and Jews, the Regency period is still often read as the story of privileged
men—headed by the Prince Regent himself—gamboling in pleasure during
the last days before Victorian reform.
Jane Rendell’s The Pursuit of Pleasure takes aim at this privileged enjoyment
and examines the ways that gender segregation worked in Regency London’s
exclusive enclaves. She uses two divergent works—Luce Irigaray’s 1978 essay
‘‘Women on the Market’’ (in This Sex Which Is Not One) and Pierce Egan’s Life in
London (1820–21)—to anchor her study of the ways in which space in Regency
London was gendered. For Rendell, these texts are ‘‘places of methodological
struggle—dialectical sites where questions of spatial and historical knowledge
were raised, where I was offered alternating and tantalizing glimpses of the relation between theory and history, between my desirous self and the city, the object of my desire’’ (3). The Pursuit of Pleasure deploys Irigaray’s thesis that
society is built upon the exchange of women to explore ‘‘the ways in which
particular texts, in this case the ramble, represent male spatial practices and
operate ideologically to define male and female mobility and visuality in public
space’’ (24). Rendell theorizes the ramble as akin to Parisian flânerie: ‘‘a gendered urban movement’’ that ‘‘allows an elaboration of the dialectical relation
between architectural history and critical theory from a feminist perspective’’
(27). Although the ramble can be read as ‘‘a representation of gendered space
where men’s need to present themselves as the only moving and looking subjects in the city results in a positioning of women as the loci and foci of male
desire,’’ Irigaray’s theory also offers Rendell the option of focusing on ‘‘women’s
agency, their ability to move and to choose how to be looked at, as cyprians
[slang term for prostitutes] or stimuli to male desire’’ (62).
Life in London, Rendell’s primary literary text for this study, is a rambling
novel cum travelogue indebted to Sterne, Fielding, and other eighteenthcentury sources. It describes the racy adventures of friends Corinthian Tom,
Jerry Hawthorne, and Bob Logic as they search for pleasure, novelty, and
amusement through a variety of well-known London locations: the Docks,
Vauxhall, the Royal Academy, Newgate Prison, the Royal Cock-Pit, Hyde Park,
a debtors’ prison, the three locations examined in The Pursuit of Pleasure, and
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many others. Despite this novel’s great contemporary popularity and the myriad imitations it spawned, Life in London was a late example of an expiring
genre. So fast was the cultural climate changing that in his 1828 sequel, The
Finish to the Adventures of Tom, Jerry and Logic in their Pursuits through Life in
and out of London, Egan felt compelled to defend the morality of its precursor
and to include more edifying content, including the reform of a fallen woman,
the deaths of Tom and Logic, the cautionary decline and death of the onceglittering courtesan Corinthian Jane, and the concluding marriage of Jerry to
genteel Mary Rosebud.
In searching for the ways in which men’s and women’s relationships to
property and space were created and perpetuated in the Regency, Rendell
wants to transcend traditional Marxist architectural history and think about
the gendering of space in a dynamic, rather than static way. Thus, her historical analysis combines architectural, cultural, and feminist perspectives to examine how patriarchal exclusion operated in three architectural bastions of
Regency London—the clubs in St. James’s Street, Almack’s Assembly Rooms,
and the Italian Opera House, all of which she connects to the ramble. Rendell
argues that Brook’s, White’s, Boodle’s, and other exclusive men’s clubs in St.
James’s Street functioned as distinctly male, public space that also encompassed what is traditionally considered the female, private home, thus successfully excluding women from both public and private space. The Italian Opera
House was a primary site for men to see and be seen, for the exchange of women’s bodies to be enacted: from alleys to the green room, women of various
status displayed themselves and looked for customers/admirers.
Although the men’s clubs in St. James’s are clearly sites of gender exclusion and the Italian Opera House is one in which women were marketed as
commodities, Almack’s is somewhat harder to categorize. This most exclusive
venue was founded and controlled by women who created an elite Regency
institution in the vast, impersonal building called Almack’s Assembly Rooms.
However, Rendell barely mentions the ‘‘Patronesses’’ or other female patrons
whose tyrannical snobbery was ironically counterpoised by colorful pasts and
contemporary scandals. Although most infamous as a site of display and marital bargaining, Almack’s was also a site for political strategizing and machinations. Indeed, Lady Jersey, the most powerful Patroness, was dubbed ‘‘queen
of London, of fashion, and of the Tory party’’ by Disraeli. In his roman à clef,
Endymion, she plays insider politics at Almack’s. However, this kind of power
doesn’t fit into Irigaray’s mother-virgin-whore scheme. By reducing Almack’s
society to its ‘‘Marriage Mart’’ reputation, Rendell can suggest that the Patronesses functioned primarily as bawds, ‘‘managing the exchange of women between men for their own benefit’’ (95).
Another problem in this chapter is Rendell’s assumption that ‘‘cyprians’’
were routinely admitted to Almack’s. Harriette Wilson apparent was, but most
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probably as a courtesy to one of her powerful male patrons like Wellington or
the Duke of Argyll. It seems extremely unlikely that the Patronesses—who despite their own sometimes dubious careers were vocal adherents of propriety—would have allowed their exclusive club to be infiltrated by outsiders,
especially women who overtly exchanged their favors for cash. However, Rendell wants to suggest that upper-class women who frequented Almack’s were
perceived no differently and were no differently oppressed than liminal
women like courtesans and prostitutes.
Although its architectural history is meticulous and comprehensive, The
Pursuit of Pleasure demonstrates a certain tone-deafness to the mores, practices, and especially class differences in Regency society. George Brummell’s
father, who was private secretary to Lord North (and thus wealthy middleclass), is erroneously identified as ‘‘a member of staff in the royal household’’
(upper servant class) (74). More seriously, Corinthian Tom is identified as an
aristocrat, although an extended passage in Life explains how Tom’s father
wore himself out making the fortune that young Tom would now be free to
dissipate. Indeed, Egan commends the unnamed father’s refusal to follow the
common practice of buying a phony title for his son. Thus, Rendell’s reading
of the novel’s Cruikshank frontispiece as a top-downward metaphor for society and her assertion that ‘‘social mobility works only one way, from a position
of privilege’’ (44) are unfounded. Instead, the ‘‘Corinthian Capital’’ shows
middle-class (albeit wealthy) Tom, Jerry, and Logic at the center, with opportunities to move upwards to the world of ‘‘The Flowers of Society’’ or down to
the plebian ‘‘Base,’’ as well as laterally to the ‘‘Ins’’ (prison) and ‘‘Outs’’ (pleasure). When Tom and Jerry go to Almack’s, they repeatedly admonish themselves to ‘‘mind our P’s and Q’s’’: not only have their rambles coarsened them,
but the practices of this elite are not natural for them, but rather learned. The
women in this text, while all certainly oppressed by patriarchy, are nonetheless
differentiated by class and Egan reads them through a distinctly middle-class
lens. Thus, the Patronesses are ridiculed for their mindless exclusivism, the
Marchioness of Diamonds is lauded because she married for love, the courtesans Kate and Jane are commended for refraining from the destructive gossip
indulgently practiced by aristocrats. In The Finish, Jerry empathizes with and
tries to rescue Ellen Prettyflower, a middle-class woman who has turned to
prostitution after being deserted by a captain of the Dragoons. Although Egan
doesn’t challenge the system, both texts show signs of discontent with aristocrtic values and anxiety about the insecurity of class status, which was increasingly fluid and dependent on money.
Despite a wealth of details and information, The Pursuit of Pleasure manipulates its material too blatantly in support of Rendell’s arguments. For example, to demonstrate that the privileged rambler sought locations ‘‘to display his
body, money, leisure time and his masculinity to other men and women’’ (50),
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she uses a line from Egan: ‘‘London is the looking-glass for TALENT.’’ However, Egan’s ‘‘looking-glass’’ is actually a bourgeois metaphor: this mirror
allows young, aspiring men to see and judge their talents more clearly in the
context of other talented aspirants, and to see ‘‘innumerable opportunities either to push forward, to retreat, to improve, or to decide.’’ Also, Rendell’s footnotes are often unhelpful in providing sources for various disputable
generalizations. Finally, there is also a sense of polemic here when more nuance is required. For example, why argue that the word ‘‘ramble’’ always indicated an urban, male excursion? What about Dorothy Wordsworth’s ‘‘A
Winter’s Ramble in Grasmere Vale’’ and Mary Shelley’s Rambles in Germany and
Italy, among many other examples of contemporary usage? Such evasions of
historical fact and complexity only serve to create doubt in the reader’s mind.
The concept of using ‘‘Women on the Market’’ and Life in London as focal
points for a critique of gendered space in Regency London is original and
thought-provoking, but doesn’t gel in this study. Egan’s ‘‘ramble’’ novel doesn’t
always conform to Rendell’s project of demonstrating upper-class control and
suppression of women in the Regency, and Irigaray’s theory of women as
property is too monolithic to illuminate the complexities of this period. There
are arguments to be made about gendered space in the Regency, but The Pursuit of Pleasure lacks the subtlety and attention to socio-historical detail to
make them.



Claire Nicolay
Loyola University Chicago

Faulkner and the Politics of Reading by Karl F. Zender. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 2002. Pp. 179 Ⳮ xx. $29.95.
For nearly thirty years Karl Zender has been one of the most thoughtful
and astute Faulkner critics and scholars in America, and for a number of years
he did the annual review of Faulkner scholarship. He is one of those critics
sophisticated about the changes effected in literary study by post-structuralist
approaches and able to employ some of them effectively in his own work, yet
with reservations about the dogmatic oppositional quality of so much work
associated with them. He continues to believe that we learn about life from
poetry and fiction itself as well as from studying the silences that surround
texts, that the aesthetic response to literature remains important, and that social and political institutions in the West can change and have changed incrementally for the better, perhaps in some small part because of the influences
of art and literature.
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Zender remains outside the traditionalist or conservative framework of
the profession but not perhaps of primary interest to oppositional critics, yet
Faulkner and the Politics of Reading, like The Crossing of the Ways: William Faulkner, the South, and the Modern World (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press,
1989), provides a great deal from which all readers of Faulkner can learn.
Tying the six essays in Zender’s new book together are two themes—drawing
‘‘together the accepting and resisting halves of my response to the new methodologies’’ and a sense of the dynamics, the changing nature, of Faulkner’s
own perspective on himself, his world, and his craft, a sense that only by appreciating those changes does one approach the figure in Faulkner’s carpet.
Earlier versions of half the pieces have been published separately. While all in
one way or another do reflect a self-conscious concern by Zender with the
works of his post-structuralist colleagues, whom he treats quite fairly, they will
generally be read as discrete essays.
The most demanding piece is the first, ‘‘The Politics of Incest,’’ which appeared in an earlier version in 1998 in American Literature. Zender’s purpose
is to revise the way readers look at a central pattern in Faulkner’s fiction, to
replace the notion that incest is used consistently throughout the novels as either a moral-religious paradigm or an oedipal motif. Zender adopts a developmental approach to show that Faulkner at least until 1940 struggled with the
theme and revised its function. He cites Faulkner’s own wide reading in the
Romantic poets, who distinguished between father-daughter incest as an expression of tyranny and brother-sister incest as an egalitarian symbol, and also
Faulkner’s awareness of relevant intellectual currents around incest in the
1920s and 1930s.
The central texts are The Sound and the Fury, Absalom, Absalom!, and Go
Down, Moses. In the Compson novel Faulkner first used the incest theme seriously, going beyond the satiric use in Mosquitoes and nostalgic use in Flags in
the Dust. Still, however, it remained tied in his mind to issues of southern regionalism, even as he rejected conventional associations such as those propagated by the novels of Erskine Caldwell. Incest is the key to Quentin’s
‘‘inability to face the implications of Caddy’s transgressions in himself,’’ but the
ahistoricism of the novel moderates Faulkner’s shift away from the uncoupling
of incest to Southern chauvinism. In Absalom, Abaslom! Faulkner ‘‘implicates
the incest motif’’ in culture and history as he also connects it to miscegenation.
Quentin, who was of course not originally in the manuscript and who—like
Shreve and Mr. Compson—is a much different character in the later book,
struggles against the weight of Southern history but can never achieve any real
political understanding of his region. Rather, he can only sense the ‘‘tragic dimension’’ of the story he has heard. At the novel’s center therefore are the
‘‘tragic consequences of the lack of political maturation’’ rather than the social
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and political dimensions of the history behind the tragedy. Zender also connects the incest theme of the novel to politics of the 1930s and the distinction
between the right’s image of ‘‘fatherland’’ and the left’s image of ‘‘brotherhood,’’ both drawing on implications of incest. This passage is too sketchy to
be convincing but does smooth the transition to Zender’s discussion of Go
Down, Moses, where Faulkner connects the incest trope to the history of slavery. In the end, of course, the book’s rich historical context must be balanced
against Ike’s, and Faulkner’s, refusal to accede to New Deal liberalism and
what is described as Northern governmental control. Ike retreats into sentimental populism and hysteria, and like Quentin ends in a failed maturation.
Faulkner, moreover, provides in neither ‘‘Delta Autumn’’ nor ‘‘Go Down,
Moses’’ much of an alternative vision for the African American. Some recent
Faulkner critics do justify the novel politically as having a kind of enlightened
postmodernism beneath it. Zender will have none of that, but still values it
highly for its wrestling with and deeper understanding of the emotional meanings of love, inequality, and marginalization.
The second essay, ‘‘Faulkner’s Privacy,’’ begins with Faulkner’s increasing
concern in his last decade with his own privacy and privacy as a social value.
Its more probing analysis is of the ‘‘aesthetic of reticence’’ that lies behind
Faulkner’s fiction and much of Modernism and that is connected to the difficulty of his texts and the elitism behind many Modern texts. For Zender privacy has in the last quarter century been decentered as a value, and an earlier
‘‘aesthetic of reticence’’ has been replaced by an ‘‘aesthetic of candor’’—not
without loss as well as gain, he might add. Nonetheless, as recent critics have
shown, it is no longer possible to read Faulkner’s fiction as generally normalizing human relations with regard, for example, to the family or to sexual relations. Too often, as in Pylon, If I Forget Thee, Jerusalem, and elsewhere he
presents unorthodox patterns that cannot be easily twisted back into orthodoxy. At the same time his fiction depends on a balance between candor and
concealment that may well have collapsed in our day. In this essay, by the way,
Zender effectively assimilates and yet challenges some of the best recent Faulkner criticism including that by Philip Weinstein, Richard Godden, and John
Duvall.
The third essay explores the problem of Caddy’s silence, her lack of a
voice in The Sound and the Fury and all that implies for a critic in a postmodern
world uneasy about innocent normalizing readings of such absences: Who
speaks for Caddy? Zender makes good use of a contrast with the Miranda stories of Katherine Anne Porter (no Faulkner fan herself ), particularly ‘‘Old Mortality’’ and ‘‘Pale Horse, Pale Rider,’’ which present a more positive alternative
to the fate of a similar postwar American woman. Zender also sees in ‘‘The
Wild Palms’’ a revision of the Quentin-Caddy relationship through Charlotte,
ostensibly capable of projecting a different ending for Caddy. Then, of course,
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she dies, an authorial decision criticized by some as simply reflecting Faulkner’s unwillingness or inability to allow any modern woman a positive future.
Zender more tolerantly allows Faulkner to opt for a mimetic story of the
‘‘tragic dilemma of modern womanhood’’ rather than a utopian vision, as some
feminists would wish. Nonetheless, here as elsewhere, he also reflects that his
critical perspective, like theirs, is in part governed by his own background,
race, class, and gender.
‘‘Lucas Beauchamp’s Voices,’’ which shifts our attention from gender to
race and class, is also Zender’s most self-conscious piece, one in which he
overtly defines his task as cultivating not a middle ground of compromise but
a synthesis of earlier formalistic and normalizing readings with postmodern
and cultural materialist revisions and also something new. Recent critics have
rejected conventional readings of ‘‘The Fire and the Hearth,’’ and, indeed, Go
Down, Moses by seeing it as a patronizing defense of a patriarchal social order
that blurs the real issues through humor and marginalizes the stories of characters like Butch Beauchamp and the granddaughter of Tennie’s Jim. Although
admiring Weinstein’s work as much as he does that of any Faulkner scholar,
Zender takes him to task here. Whereas Weinstein attributes his perspective
on race relations and novels like this one in part to his childhood relationship
to a black domestic worker, Zender says his own perspective was equally conditioned by his working-class background but that his racial views were liberalized by inculcating American democratic values through the culture he
learned. Touché! More important is Zender’s thoughtful consideration of Lucas’s story and of Lucas’s adopting Zack’s voice as an ‘‘acquisition, as an aggressive and ambitious co-optation for his own purposes of the voice of the
dominant order.’’ Zender recognizes and certainly does not in any way dismiss
oppositional skepticism about ‘‘The Fire and the Hearth,’’ but, as Henry James
implied when insisting that we must grant a serious author his own donnée,
we cannot ask or expect Faulkner to write someone else’s story. He cannot
write the book that Morrison or Wright or Baldwin or Walker would write.
That it is Lucas’s white not black forebears who play a role in this story is its
limitation, but much of consequence remains.
‘‘Forgetting the Father’’ is an insightful reading of ‘‘Barn Burning,’’ that
first appeared in 1989. It grew out of Zender’s uneasiness with readers’ elision
of a central tension between realistic and symbolic interpretations revolving
around Sarty Snopes’s killing of the father. Zender studies that very tension,
emphasizing the complex relationship between Sarty and his father, and in
particular insists on our confronting Ab’s role as ‘‘teacher’’ and re-seeing the
events from Ab’s point of view, which is the key to one of Faulkner’s real accomplishments in this tale. To be sure, as Zender argues, Faulkner—by not
providing Sarty with any alternative that promises him a future—fails or refuses ‘‘to accommodate the demands of psychic growth to the realities of social
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existence.’’ Faulkner, however, does the same thing over and over throughout
his career particularly in father-son relationships. Zender tweaks the nose of
some critics—including Weinstein and Carolyn Porter—for not merely ignoring but demeaning father-son relationships in the fiction; but his most significant point in this essay relates, within the context of modern writing, to that
very cultural question ‘‘of the fatherly transmission of values. . . . How and
what should fathers teach?’’
‘‘Where Is Yoknapatawpha County?,’’ the final essay, has as its surface
topic the ‘‘absence of referential specificity in Faulkner’s late fiction’’ or the
evolution of the relationship between the realistic and the visionary/mythical
dimensions of Yoknapatawpha County towards the latter over the course of
Faulkner’s career. The key text is Requiem for a Nun, whose prose sections best
exemplify the trend after World War II. Zender also makes much of a comparison with John Updike’s distinctly mimetic Pennsylvania fiction and of Joan
Williams’s The Wintering, which provides a prism for re-visioning novels such
as The Town and The Mansion. Zender accepts that Faulkner in some ways
turned aside from ‘‘direct engagement with troubling aspects of his internal
life’’ and never exploited Gavin Stevens as profoundly as he had Quentin Compson as a vehicle for such engagement. Rather he retreated into ‘‘sublimated and
idealized’’ versions of the stories just as he never conditioned himself to the
implications of postwar democratic liberalism.
I say ‘‘surface’’ topic, though it is also the primary topic, because running
through the final essay is a deeply felt dialogue with cultural materialist colleagues (and, perhaps, New Critical teachers). A reader keeps feeling it is
Zender-Faulkner-Quentin-Gavin riding through the text and agonizing over
whether he can successfully adjust in a poststructuralist world in which the
essential value of what led you to tie your identity to this career—Faulkner (as
it might for Stephen Greenblatt be Shakespeare)—is now of dubious ‘‘essential’’ value. Can you kill the father and still reserve a room in the family mansion with your New Americanist brothers and sisters, if, that is, the family
mansion survives? So the essay, like the book, is also a dialogue with those
who might—in their revisionary resistance to referentiality, aesthetic pleasure
as a cardinal value, and the intrinsic meanings of canonical texts as apologetic
and conservative—turn all of our attention to the absences and silences outside the tales we study. Zender seeks a broader synthesis of meanings that includes positivistic readings, external silences, and also the absences inside the
text generated by the author, as in the ‘‘problem’’ of Gavin Stevens. Zender
believes he sees in the profession beyond ‘‘deconstructive pathos’’ and cultural
materialism’s excessive devaluation of the surface of the text a future that can
productively assimilate all the New Americanists have taught yet can still proclaim a positive political and social value for canonical literature and, yes, for
the importance of aesthetic responses.
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Zender writes well and is a creative thinker with a broad-ranging mind,
so he is always a pleasure to read. He provides many new ways to approach
Faulkner, so his new book is important to Faulknerians. He also raises some
fundamental questions about the future of the house of literary study and how
its discourse will be controlled as we ‘‘teach’’ the next generations how and
what to read.



John Bassett
Clark University

Perceiving Animals, Humans and Beasts in Early Modern English Culture by Erica
Fudge. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2002. Pp. x Ⳮ 233.
$19.95 paper.
Perceiving Animals’s final chapter on Richard Overton is a powerful example of why animals matter. For Overton the line between human and beasts
was rather unclear. He contradicted Reform theology on two key points. He
believed that the soul was wed to the body so that at death the soul dies, only
to be resurrected on Judgment Day, and he maintained that animals were innocent creatures condemned to suffer because of man’s sin but due to their
innocence granted a place in heaven. In both cases the barriers that differentiate the human from the animal are leveled. For Overton, key human abilities
of reason (humanism), conscience (theology), and science remain unnatural
elements of culture unless they are regulated by education. With such a claim,
as Fudge explains: ‘‘Overton is proposing that the qualities of human-ness become the substitutes for the human. There is an incomplete being which can
be termed human, and this being is completed by learning which can, for
Overton, as for humanist writers, be lost. The a priori human has disappeared
from view’’ (153). With his belief in humanity as a state to be attained rather
than granted, Overton considers political reformation crucial for regaining our
prelapsarian humanness. Erica Fudge presents a similar logic throughout Perceiving Animals. Scientists, humanists, and theologians attempt to make distinctions and raise barriers between the human and the animal. Yet in each
case they expose degrees of similarity rather than difference in kind between
species. While the book focuses on early modern culture, it speaks to culture
today. As we have less and less contact with animals in our daily lives and as
the humanities reinforce anthropocentric constructions of the world, Perceiving Animals gives us an important reminder of the unstable distinction between
ourselves and other living beings.
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Fudge begins her book with a dramatic first chapter, ‘‘Screaming Monkeys.’’ Alessandro Magno describes the tourist attraction of the Bear Garden in
London: a monkey dressed like a human is set atop a horse and while the
horse gallops around the ring, packs of hungry dogs are set to attack the horse
and rider. Magno finds the monkey-baiting to be entertaining sport but finds
the next show, bear-baiting, unpleasant to watch. Fudge wonders why the distinction. As the chapter proceeds, she finds that animals miming human activity is considered humorous for the spectator only when there is a clear sense
of what constitutes the human and the barrier between animal and human is
steadfastly in place. As Magno watches the show, ‘‘his sense of his own humanity is constantly being reinforced’’ (13). With bear-baiting, the bear is chained
to a pole and the spectators are locked in the Bear Garden ostensibly for their
own protection. The spectators’ confinement mimes the bear’s and suggests
that human mastery of nature has its limits. Furthermore, the cruelty of baiting
reveals the base nature of humanity, putting humans below rather than above
beasts. As Fudge succinctly explains: ‘‘The violence involved in taming wild
nature—in expressing human superiority—destroys the difference between
the species’’ (19).
Later in the chapter Fudge looks at the comparisons between women,
slaves, and people of other nations to animals. These people are only nominally human but, to show their base inferiority, they are figured as bestial.
Turning analogy against itself: ‘‘If what happens to animals is a representation
of what is happening to some humans then animal suffering must be staged to
replicate human suffering, therefore there must be a belief that animals can
suffer in a way which is analogous to the human’’ (17). To be cruel is to assert
similarity. Who is human and what counts as human is increasingly clear. Perceiving Animals is about using animals, perceiving and reading them, in an attempt to define human-ness.
Chapter Two examines the theological definition of human as a being
with a conscience, unlike the animal which has none. Fudge illustrates this
definition through the works of William Perkins, a Calvinist reformer who was
widely read and influential in Puritan theology. The child, the atheist, the
werewolf, and the wildman live on the borders of what it means to be human
in early modern culture. Conscience requires understanding but a child has
none. An atheist has decided to reject God, but Reform theology argues that
he is predestined and could not have freely chosen. The werewolf shows that
either humans can temporarily lose conscience and become animal or that
bestial wildness is part of conscience itself. Finally, Fudge carefully monitors
changes in the wildman tale of Valentine and Orson to reveal how it is civilization, not conscience, that determines humanness in this story. In each case, it
is the ability to speak rather than conscience or reason that defines the human.
The child must learn speech and so enter culture, the atheist is said to bark
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like a dog, as does the werewolf, and the wildman is only wild before he learns
to speak.
Chapter Three looks at how humanism uses eloquence as a gauge for humanness and how Perkins’s emphasis on conscience gets replaced by discernment. Fudge offers Sidney’s The Old Arcadia as an example. The poem is about
King Basilius’s inability to read beneath the surface of the oracle’s prophecy.
The king is unable to perceive that Cleophila is not a real woman but instead
Pyrocles cross-dressing. The queen reads beneath Cleophila’s garments but
fails to put her knowledge to good use. Fudge then applies this reading lesson
to Philisides’ creation fable found between books three and four of The Old
Arcadia. The story explains how each animal gives one of its skills to the making of a human who can rule over them all. In addition to giving from their
talents, all the animals must surrender their ability to speak. Once man is created, he takes advantage of his power and destroys the natural order among
beasts. In good humanist fashion, reading beneath the tale for its message, Sidney’s poem is about the fear of absolute monarchy. Fudge suggests that we
read the surface of the tale which explains that animals precede humans in
their ability to speak. Reading the surface upsets the humanist valuation of
speech as the defining characteristic of humanness. This reading goes unnoticed, since readers are trained to look beyond the story about beasts for a narrative within and about human culture. Reading fables, we never confront the
animal.
The problem of reading is extended to science in Chapter Four. Francis
Bacon uses vivisection to read beyond the surface of animals into their nature.
While Bacon’s empiricism seems to free him from religious biases of former
scientific enquiry, he explains his work as striving to restore ‘‘man’s dominion
. . . to [its] promised bounds,’’ to restore prelapsarian knowledge about nature
(101). Bacon’s categorization and naming mimes Adam’s mandate in Genesis
to name all the animals. As Bacon explains, the first man ‘‘saw all their [animal]
insides, [while] we his posterity ever since, with all our experience, can but see
their skins’’ (104). Peering beneath the skin of animals, Bacon seeks to restore
humanity’s moral and spiritual loss. Finally, Fudge notes that animal vivisection was and is often used as a substitute for dissecting humans. In doing so,
the difference between human and animal collapses. In such moments, naming becomes an attempt to reestablish the lost sense of physical difference.
The problem of knowing animals gets further consideration in Chapter
Five. In court disputes over legal possession of an animal, the owner had to
show that he knew the character and individualizing traits of the beast. As
Fudge explains: ‘‘Such recognition narrows the gap between owner and owned
and destroys the function of these categories to make difference and superiority’’ (117).
While Perceiving Animals covers known and a bit more obscure figures of
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the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Fudge’s project speaks across periods
and genres. Ecocriticism and literary and cultural studies in general have
much to learn from her relentless desire to see animals rather than to see
through them to the human. With the reissue of Perceiving Animals, now in
paperback, a crucial text in animal studies is now widely available for students
and scholars alike.
Ron Broglio
Georgia Institute of Technology

